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PENSACOLA NAVAL STATION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR HISTORICAL
RESEARCH USING AGENCY THEORY
Abstract: This contract dispute enhances our understanding of agency
relationships and fosters greater recognition of the limitations and
hazards of historical research using an agency literature framework.
The accounting records, related memoranda, and reports submitted
also provide insight into the nature and character of early defense
contract accounting and relationships between these contractors and
the government. Difficulties confronted by the Navy in securing a
contractor; contract terms; civilian contractor's project accounting
records, related memoranda, and correspondence with naval authorities are reviewed. The post-contract correspondence provides insight
into how early 19th century government contractors attempted to
resolve disputes with the government.

Introduction 1
Today, government is the largest consumer of products and
services in the United States. Government contracting with private sector suppliers has been a constant from the earliest days
of U.S. history. Modern legislation, e.g., the Federal Acquisition
Regulation Act and Truth in Negotiations Act, have established
standards governing contractors' dealings with the government.
The Cost Accounting Standards Board has issued standards to
promote uniformity and consistency in the way defense contractors measure, assign, and allocate contract costs. The Defense
Contract Audit Agency, the General Accounting Office, and
1
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other audit agencies have responsibilities for auditing compliance with contract terms. In short, doing business with the government has become highly institutionalized; contractor rights
and obligations are highly circumscribed by contract, regulation, and law. A formal process for mediating contract disputes
is in place, and when mediation fails there is access to the court
system. In our era, this formal institutionalized framework is
largely taken for granted. Such was not always the case. The
contracting environment confronting the government contractor
of the early 19th century stands in stark contrast to the n o r m of
today. An appreciation for the efficacy of our current bureaucratic contracting environment can be gained by examining an
early government contract. Moreover, the dangers inherent in
extending modern rational expectations and assumptions to earlier periods of history become evident. Modern assumptions
may be invalid in a pre-bureaucratic era where justice was more
personalized and less systematized. In earlier periods, due process was less assured, and arbitrariness and personally motivated animosity or favoritism was less restrained. Such conditions may preempt and negate assumptions underlying
historical research using an agency theory framework. 2
In 1826, Samuel Keep of Boston received a contract from
the federal government to superintend the construction of the
original facilities at the Pensacola Naval Air Station then known
as the Pensacola Naval Station or Navy Yard. 3 This 19th century
contract dispute affords some insights that may contribute to
our contemporary understanding of agency relations. Specifically, much of contemporary accounting agency theory focuses
on instances where the agent breaches, reneges, or otherwise
shortchanges the principal to the contract. In this instance, how2

See Max Weber's short essay on bureaucracy in From Max Weber, H. H.
Gerth and C. W. Mills (eds), Oxford University Press 1946, pp. 216-221, for a
discussion of the significant differences between justice based on personal factors and justice based on abstract procedures and rules of law.
3
In 1975, the John C. Pace Library at The University of West Florida acquired the personal correspondence and accounting m e m o r a n d a of Samuel
Keep. Among these records are a copy of the original contract, payment vouchers for supplies and materials, payroll records, and construction progress reports
as well as many letters addressed to members of his family and such notables of
Keep's day as President Andrew Jackson, Vice-President Henry Clay, Senator
Daniel Webster, Secretary of the Navy S a m u e l S o u t h a r d , a n d William
Bainbridge who was the highest ranking naval officer of the time and chairman
of the Board of Navy Commissioners. These documents provide the basis for this
p>aper and unless specifically stated otherwise all quotes come from them.
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ever, it was the principal, i.e., the federal government, that reneged on the contract despite diligent performance by the civilian contractor/agent.
Contractual relations are frequently a good deal more complicated t h a n simple principal-agent models suggest. While
simple principal-agent models may be helpful in understanding
relationships, the contract under consideration in this article is
complex in structure and operation. There is a hierarchy of control in this early defense contract that is typical of many modern
contracts. Specifically, roles are less clearly defined than simply
agent-principal, i.e., an actor may be simultaneously an agent of
some principal and the principal of another agent. In this instance, both the civilian contractor and the naval officers were
acting as agents of the federal government. However, from the
perspective of the civilian contractor/agent Samuel Keep, the
agent/naval officers were principals.
A basic assumption underlying agency theory is that all parties to a contract behave in a rational, utility maximizing manner [Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 307; Fama, 1980, p. 289]. Often, agency theory literature depicts actors in agency models as
self-interested individuals with the goal of maximizing net income [Baiman, 1990, p. 155]. However, Mills has stated that
income or wealth utility maximization alone is not sufficient to
explain the behavior of all agents [Mills, 1993, p. 802]. In some
circumstances, agents may seek to maximize some utility function that transcends pursuit of personal financial advantage,
e.g., a sense of duty, honor, loyalty. The Keep contract provides
some insight into agency relationship frictions that can not be
directly attributed to income maximization. The naval authorities who were party to this contract as principals did not reap
any personal advantage, and yet they were unrelenting in their
refusal to honor the terms of the contract with the civilian contractor.
The Keep contract is particularly interesting because enforcement of its terms became an issue; it gave rise to one of the
first defense contract disputes in American history. Contemporary agency theory presumes that contract enforcement is a
matter of judicial intervention. Specifically, Baiman states:
The central focus of agency theory is the employment
contract (which includes the agent's payment schedule
and the monitoring system). Contracts are enforced by
legal institutions. The decision of legal institutions as to
whether an employment contract has been honored or
Published by eGrove, 1995
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violated depends upon the evidence that can be submitted by the contracting parties to the legal enforcement
mechanism. [Baiman, p. 168, 1990]
Keep's efforts to enforce the terms of his contract with the
government suggest that this agency theory assumption was not
satisfied in the early 19th century. The contractor's pursuit of
reparations from the government through personal lobbying and
pleading provides a stark contrast to the institutionalized conflict resolution assumed by agency theory.
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE CONTRACT
The United States bought Florida from Spain for $5,000,000
in 1819. This transfer was formally accepted in Pensacola on
July 17, 1821 by General Andrew Jackson, who was then military commander of the territory. In 1822, Congress established
the Territory of Florida with Pensacola as its capitol; Jackson
was appointed its first governor.
During the Napoleonic Wars, most of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in Latin America took advantage of the unsettled conditions in Europe to break away from their mother
country. By the end of 1822, Mexico and many countries in
Central and South America had freed themselves from colonial
rule, and the United States had formally recognized their independence. However, the three leading monarchies of Europe,
i.e., Russia, Austria, and Prussia, encouraged Spain and Portugal to reassert their authority over their former colonies. In an
address to Congress in December 1823, President James Monroe
proclaimed that the United States would defend all independent
nations of the Western Hemisphere against European intervention; this Monroe Doctrine became a cornerstone of United
States foreign policy.
This backdrop of political upheaval and uncertainty provided the impetus for major military development along the
southern coast of the United States. Over a period of twenty-five
years a series of strategically placed forts and navy yards were
built. In Pensacola, Ft. Pickens and Ft. McRee were built to
guard the entrance to the port; the harbor itself became home to
the first permanent U.S. Navy installation on the Gulf Coast. At
the same time, fifty miles to the west, Ft. Morgan and Ft. Gaines
were built to guard the entrance to the port of Mobile, Alabama.
At the conclusion of this defense build-up, many passes from the
open sea to important seaports were guarded by forts [Bailey,
1966, pp. 236-242].
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol22/iss1/3
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THE TASK
The first of the defense installations to be built was the
Pensacola Navy Yard. On February 25, 1825, a bill authorizing
construction of facilities for a new navy yard and depot at
Pensacola, Florida was passed by the U.S. Senate, and the
House gave its approval on March 3, 1825 [Pearce, 1980, p. 5].
At the time, journeymen construction workers or "master
mechanics" were scarce. There was an abundance of work for
such skilled workmen along the populated Eastern Seaboard. It
was not easy to entice workmen to leave familiar surroundings,
family and friends, to journey three weeks (under the best of
sailing conditions) to a frontier town known for yellow fever
epidemics and poor living conditions.
THE PRINCIPAL
An important component of any principal's task in the principal-agent relationship is the selection of the "best" agent. The
principal in this contractual relationship was the Board of Navy
Commissioners, most frequently referred to in correspondence
of the day as the Navy Board. This organization was charged
with responsibility for letting the contract and supervising construction. 4 To this end, the Navy Board circulated notices soliciting bids among qualified "master builders," published invitations to bid in major newspapers, and posted notices in federal
government offices. After unsuccessfully negotiating with several contractors for over a year and a half, the Navy Board
concluded negotiations with Samuel Keep.
The circumstances surrounding the Navy Board's acceptance of Keep as labor contractor for the Pensacola Navy Yard
are necessary background for understanding subsequent events
relating to the contract. First, the Navy Board was motivated
and eager to commence work on the new facilities as quickly as
possible. Moreover, established and presumably knowledgeable
contractors were reluctant to bid on the project or demanded
compensation that the Navy Board deemed excessive. As will
become apparent later, the fact that the Navy Board granted the
contract to Keep is itself some measure of its desperation and
4

The Board of Navy Commissioners was created by act of Congress in 1815
and was made up of three captains (then the highest rank in the Navy). Commissioners were appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate and were
invested with delegated executive authority.
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frustration. Certainly, given more favorable circumstances, the
Navy Board would not have awarded the contract to Keep.
Both principal and agent confront considerable risk when
they enter into a contract each knowing relatively little about
the other. The Navy Board and Keep had no on-going relationship, and there was an extreme degree of information asymmetry present in the contract negotiation. Given the time and distance between Boston and Pensacola (three weeks by ship down
the Atlantic coastline, around Key West, and u p the west coast
of Florida) and the communications capabilities of the time,
Samuel Keep must have been markedly ignorant of the conditions in Pensacola. By contrast, the Board was better informed.
As a consequence of receiving reports from Navy personnel already in place in Pensacola, the Board was knowledgeable of
local conditions at the proposed construction site. In addition,
after unsuccessfully negotiating with other prospective contractors, the Navy Board knew precisely what other contractors required in terms of compensation to take on the Pensacola
project. Presumably, this information asymmetry worked to the
advantage of the Navy Board in its contract negotiations with
Keep. In addition, Keep was totally inexperienced in bidding on
government contracts. Overall, Keep must have been at a great
disadvantage in contract negotiations.
From the perspective of agency theory, each party to this
contractual relationship was motivated by self-interest. No
doubt, Keep thought he had negotiated a contract that would
allow him to break into government contracting and maximize
his personal net worth. From the perspective of the Navy Board,
they needed the work to commence as soon as possible at the
cheapest possible rates. To this end, the Navy Board exploited
the asymmetric information set they possessed and Keep's eagerness to make a start in the construction business. The Board
was successful in securing below market rates for the project as
evidenced by the fact that no other supplier was interested in
the contract.
THE AGENT
Samuel Keep, an unmarried m a n in his mid-twenties, was
the youngest son of an established and prosperous Boston area
builder and the brother of Dr. Nathan C. Keep who founded the
Dental School at Harvard University. Keep's personal correspondence and his business records suggest that he was an articulate
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol22/iss1/3
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and well- educated m a n of his time. Samuel served his apprenticeship working for his father on various construction projects
in and around Boston. Previously, Keep had never been awarded
or even bid a single construction contract, his very first venture
as an independent builder in his own right was the Pensacola
Navy Yard contract. Given Keep's personal circumstances —
young, well to do, and eager to begin a business in his own right
— it is reasonable to assume that he was less risk averse than an
established builder. From Keep's point of view, the Pensacola
contract must have looked like a great opportunity. In summary,
Samuel Keep was young, inexperienced as a builder and totally
unproven as a contractor. Certainly, this is not the profile of the
ideal candidate for a major government contract. It seems that
Keep's principal qualification was his lack of risk aversion, as
evidenced by his willingness to accept the contract.
THE CONTRACT
According to the terms of the contract signed on September
8, 1826, Keep was to go to Pensacola and superintend the construction of the wharf and buildings at the new navy yard. All
construction materials including tools and implements were to
be supplied by the Navy Board. Keep was to hire "8 master
masons and 10 skillful wharf builders" and transport them to
the project site. In addition, Keep agreed to remain in Pensacola
with his builders for two years. In compensation, Keep was to
receive:
$2,000 per a n n u m for himself and $2.50 per day for the
mechanics to be in full compensation for all the services which may be rendered by him or them and for all
charges and expenses which he the said Keep may incur and subject himself to on account of this contract.
The contract provided that Keep's salary and the $2.50 per day
for the mechanics would commence with departure from Boston. Payments were to be made to Keep at the Pensacola Naval
Station upon the presentation of bills to the local commanding
officer.
PRELIMINARY PREPARATIONS
Before departing from Boston, Keep recruited 8 masons
and 10 wharf builders. According to Keep's correspondence, the
prevailing wage in Boston for such men was $1.75 per day. To
induce men to travel to the Florida hinterlands, separated from
Published by eGrove, 1995
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friends and family, Keep offered premium wages as well as food
and lodging. Keep negotiated worker wage rates based on his
judgment of each worker's skill and experience. Exhibit 1 is a
list of Keep's crew and their associated pay rates. Wages ranged
from $2.10 to $3.00 per day with an average daily wage of $2.33.
This was a premium of 25 percent over the existing wage in
Boston without considering the value of food and lodging provided by Keep in Pensacola.
EXHIBIT 1

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol22/iss1/3
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Each builder executed a labor contract (some preprinted
and others handwritten) agreeing to work with Keep for two
years at the Pensacola Naval Station. Exhibit 2 is an example of
the preprinted contracts signed by each worker. The difference
between the worker's wages and the $2.50 government contract
amount was justified in Keep's mind by the fact that he provided
food and lodging for the workers and paid the cost of their
transportation from Boston to Pensacola.
EXHIBIT 2

Published by eGrove, 1995
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Besides hiring builders, Keep hired an accounting clerk who
was charged with responsibility for maintaining project records.
This clerk contracted to work for the sum of $50 per m o n t h plus
food and lodging; an amount that was approximately equal to
the wages received by the master builders. The salary of the
accounting clerk was not reimbursable cost under the terms of
the contract; therefore, Keep absorbed this cost out of his $2,000
per year. Surviving project records and memoranda are testimonials to the thoroughness and competence of this accounting
clerk. However, one might reasonably question the business
judgment of Samuel Keep; he committed better than 30 percent
of his annual contract compensation for the services of a fulltime bookkeeper.
The contract granted Keep permission to erect on navy yard
property "such barracks or other buildings as may be found
necessary and convenient for the accommodation of himself and
men while employed at the naval station." The materials and
labor cost for construction of the barracks were to be born by
Keep. Before departing from Boston, Keep purchased a considerable amount of food, building materials for the barracks including 15,000 feet of lumber and nails, furnishings for the barracks, clothing, and medical supplies. Cash d i s b u r s e m e n t
records for these purchases total $848.98. According to the shipping contract presented as Exhibit 3, the transport of the building materials and supplies to Pensacola via Key West cost $116.
The cost of passage on the same ship for Keep and his nineteen
m e n was $380. Therefore, d o c u m e n t e d s u p p o r t exists for
$1,344.98 in cost before the first dollar of government contract
money was received. Available personal correspondence and accounting records give no indication as to the source of Keep's
start-up money. However, it seems reasonable to surmise that
these funds were provided by his family.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol22/iss1/3
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EXHIBIT 3

PROJECT ACCOUNTING RECORDS
There is no evidence of a double entry bookkeeping system
in any of the project records. The financial records are single
entry "day book" accounts that chronicle cash disbursements
a n d receipts. There are no financial s t a t e m e n t s for either
Samuel Keep personally or the construction project. Labor reports submitted to the officer in charge of the navy yard constituted billing under this contract. Hence, construction labor in
terms of duties assigned or work performed and labor time for
each of Keep's employees is fully documented.
The records show that the first three weeks of October
1826, i.e., the first three weeks at the construction site, were
spent constructing the barracks for the crew. In addition to the
building materials brought from Boston, brick and other construction materials for the barracks were purchased locally. For
the period October 1826 to June 30, 1827, local purchases for
food and building materials totaled $1,288.82. These expendit u r e s are s u p p o r t e d by itemized s t a t e m e n t s from v a r i o u s
Pensacola suppliers. Exhibit 4 is an itemized statement of cash
payments made to one Pensacola supplier for the period October 26-December 30, 1826.
Published by eGrove, 1995
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EXHIBIT 4

The principal project accounting records were reports of
days worked s u b m i t t e d to the c o m m a n d i n g officer of the
Pensacola Naval Station as a basis for payment under the contract. During the developmental stages of the project all m e n
were engaged in such activities as digging sand or felling and
hewing timber for use in the construction. During this period,
project reports were submitted on an infrequent basis. Between
December 1826 and March 1827 three reports which covered
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol22/iss1/3
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overlapping intervals — October 27-November 30, October 27February 28, and February 16- February 28 — were submitted.
The 5 column tabular February 16- February 28, 1827 project
report presented as Exhibit 5 is typical of these reports. After
February 16, project reports were submitted biweekly in a
EXHIBIT 5
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EXHIBIT 6
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"spreadsheet" format. Exhibit 6 is typical of these reports. Beginning with the February 16-28 report, these reports show that
the men were assigned to a multitude of small and large projects
which were going on simultaneously. The columnar headings on
these reports were consistent: workers' name, occupation (either
brick layer or wharf builder), days worked (no hourly work
records were maintained and the smallest time increment which
appears in these reports is 1/2 day), and project (commandant's
house, hospital, barracks chimney, wharf, et al.)
THE CONTRACT DISPUTE
As noted, Keep invested a significant amount of money in
performance of this contract before arrival at the job site. Upon
arrival in Pensacola, Keep presented a bill for $945 (21 days in
passage for 18 men at $2.50 per day) to the commanding officer.
Unfortunately, Keep discovered that the local commanding officer, Lt. Commander Edward R. McCall, did not feel bound by
the Navy Board's contract. This officer refused to pay Keep
$2.50 per m a n as the contract stated. Why a United States Navy
officer would take it upon himself to act in this way is pure
speculation. The officer's actions were clearly inconsistent with
the explicitly stated terms of Keep's contract with the Navy
Board. At this juncture, Keep threatened to take his craftsmen
and leave Pensacola. Faced with this threat the commanding
officer backed down and paid Keep. However, McCall wrote the
Navy Board for instructions about how he should proceed in the
future.
There is little doubt that personal animosity existed between
McCall and Keep. According to Keep's correspondence, McCall
referred to Keep as "You God damned Yanke." McCall was described by Keep as "a vile and intemperate man." It is evident
from reading Keep's personal correspondence that he feared
McCall. Early in his stay in Pensacola, Keep began carrying two
loaded pistols because McCall had threatened him.
Little is known of Keep's antagonist — Edward R. McCall.
However, according to the 1827 Navy Register, McCall was born
in South Carolina, commissioned an officer in the U.S. Navy on
January 1, 1808, and promoted to the rank of lieutenant commander on March 3, 1825 when he assumed c o m m a n d of the
Pensacola Navy Yard [Navy Register, 1827, pp. 782]. The personal antagonism between McCall and Keep coincidentally paralleled larger historical currents. In many ways, the ill tempered
r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n Keep, a M a s s a c h u s e t t s Yankee, a n d
Published by eGrove, 1995
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McCall, a fiery South Carolinian, seems to personify regional
animosities that afflicted the United States at this time in its
history.
Subsequently, Keep submitted his labor bill for the m o n t h
of October. The bill submitted included the time spent by the
men building the barracks. McCall refused to pay stating that
"men were not to draw wages when they did not work." As
justification, Keep cited a clause in his contract which stated
that he "shall not suffer for the want of materials and tools" and
pointed out that the Navy had failed to provide materials to
begin construction and that if the men had not built the barracks they would have been idle. Signed stores receipts show
that it was not until October 27, 1826 that the navy delivered
supplies and tools to Keep for the actual construction project.
According to the terms of Keep's contract, it was the responsibility of the Navy to provide all tools, implements, and materials
for the construction.
In response to McCall's request, the Navy Board's instructions were that he should authorize payment for the actual
amount to be received by each worker and that payment should
be made directly to the worker and not Keep. This is in clear
contradiction of the explicit terms of Samuel Keep's contract
with the Navy Board. At this point, it seems that the Navy Board
summarily abrogated its contract with Keep.
Given the hindsight provided by almost 170 years, it appears that the Navy Board acted in bad faith by agreeing to
Keep's terms, alluring him to the job site in the remote hinterlands, and ignoring the explicitly stated terms of the contract.
Surviving documents leave little doubt that the Navy Board
acted dishonorably. In the correspondence files between the
Navy Board and Samuel Keep, there is no indication that the
Navy found any fault with either the pace or quality of Keep's
work at the Pensacola Naval Station. To the contrary, even Lt.
Commander Edward R. McCall, the very same commanding officer who refused to honor the payment terms of Keep's contract, described the quality of Keep's work as "commendable."
Whether the government's conduct in this matter is an isolated incident or part of a widespread pattern of "bad faith"
contract dealing is a question not easily answered. It may be
that the seeds of this contract dispute lie in a personality clash
between two agents of the Navy Board — Keep and McCall.
Acting as agent for the Navy Board in its dealings with Keep,
McCall challenged the terms of the contract and refused to dishttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol22/iss1/3
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burse funds according to its terms. It is significant that once
McCall acted, the Navy Board never wavered in its support of
his position. Perhaps, loyalty to a fellow career naval officer was
the overriding motivation of the Navy Board. If this was the
case, then any civilian contractor doing business with the Navy
did so at their own peril. Written contracts could be ignored or
completely disregarded with impunity — not a very comforting
prospect for an outsider doing business with the government.
Without the difference between what he received from the
Navy and what he paid the men, Keep had nothing to defray the
cost of food and lodging provided to his craftsmen. Keep protested to the Navy Board and attempted to bring formal charges
against McCall and Lt. Commander Thomas S. Cunningham, Sr.
who succeeded McCall as commandant of the Pensacola Naval
Station. Secretary of the Navy Samuel Southard's response to
Keep's attempt to bring charges against the officers was simply
to assert that "as a civilian Keep had no standing" that allowed
him to bring charges against uniformed officers of the United
States Navy. Keep was fired by the Navy Board on June 28, 1827
and accused of "practicing deception before the contract was
signed in that he assured them (the Navy Board) that he could
not obtain mechanics for less than $2.50 per day when he knew
that he could and that he actually did hire them for less and did
put the difference in his own pocket amounting to $3.00 per day
to his own advantage."
This assertion of "deception" by the contractor sounds particularly disingenuous and implausible considering the fact that
the Navy Board had unsuccessfully attempted to sign a contractor for a year and a half before awarding the contract to Keep.
The Board was in a position to know the going rate of pay for
skilled workmen.
A more plausible explanation is that the Navy Board chose
to back the actions of its career officers notwithstanding the
terms of the contract. Or, perhaps the Board concluded that
they had made a bad bargain, and first tried to rewrite the contract to their liking and when that did not work they simply
fired the contractor after much of the work had been completed.
In a letter addressed to his brother shortly before his July
1827 departure from Pensacola, Keep stated, "I have spent more
to fulfill my contract than I should make in ten years if I should
stay so long in this country for two thousand per annum." The
Navy Board's flagrant disregard for his contract left Keep with
little recourse. Keep left Pensacola and went to Washington to
Published by eGrove, 1995
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pursue his claims against the Navy Board.
Today, in the event of a contract dispute, the issue as to
whether a contract has been honored or violated is likely to be
decided in the court system. Evidence is submitted according to
specific rules of admissibility in an ostensibly impartial court
proceeding and the contested issue is decided by judge or jury.
This m a n n e r of conflict resolution has been institutionalized, is
expected, and largely taken-for-granted. Such was not true in
Keep's day; he did not retain legal counsel nor did he sue the
government for breach of contract. At this point in our history,
it seems that government was less securely based on the rule of
law. Justice was more a matter of personal contact and influence.
Keep pursued his claim personally with the Washington bureaucracy. Unfortunately, Keep's experience battling the Washington bureaucracy was frustrating and dispiriting. Initially, he
pursued his claim for reparations with the civilian Secretary of
the Navy. In an October 1827 letter to Secretary of the Navy
Southard, Keep stated: "Such has been the high handed injustice & injury to me, that I have come to the defensive action to
demand redress at the bar of Congress for the severe losses I
have sustained." Secretary Southard was not sympathetic to
Keep's claims against the Navy, but suggested that Keep document his case and submit it to the Treasury Department for a
decision on the merits of his case.
Acting on Southard's recommendation, Keep took his cause
to the Treasury Department's 4th Auditor's Office which was
charged with adjudicating claims made against the government.
In a March 28, 1828 opinion addressed to Navy Secretary
Southard, the auditor disallowed Keep's claims by declaring:
Having carefully examined the documents in the case of
Mr. Samuel Keep late Superintendent referred to me by
you, I have the honor to report, that nearly all the
charges made by Mr. Keep appear to be founded upon
an assumed violation of his rights and an improper interference in his duties, by E. R. McCall and Thomas S.
Cunningham Sr. U.S.N, commanders, officers at the
Pensacola Station. Not having any thing explanatory or
defensive from these two officers, you will readily see
the improbability of my forming any decision on the
justice of Mr. Keep's claims. The vouchers to support
the several items in his account are not sufficiency clear
to justify me in allowing it. By letter from the Navy
Commissioners it will be seen that his salary was to
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol22/iss1/3

18

act for construction of facilities at the Pensacola Naval Station and its implications for historica
Gray and Calvasina: 1826 Construction

Contract for Pensacola Naval Station

53

cease on or about the 28th June 1827. If however these
claims were to be decided on at present, without further information, according to the terms of the contract, I do not think they ought to be allowed. [[T.
Matkins], 18 March 1828]
Keep was equally unsuccessful in stimulating any interest in
his dispute with members of either the U.S. House or Senate.
Daniel Webster, who represented Keep's home state of Massachusetts in the U.S. Senate, stated in a letter to Keep that "he
could not attend to applications of this kind, that the business is
between you and the Navy Board" [Keep, 23 April, 1828].
For three years, Keep remained in Washington and petitioned the government for redress for the Navy's conduct. Notwithstanding his persistent efforts to remedy the wrongs done to
him by the government, he was totally unsuccessful. After termination of his contract, Keep never received another penny from
the federal government.
In 1830, a week after his marriage to a wealthy Washington
widow, Keep died an untimely and tragic death at the age of 29.
Keep and his new bride checked into a Baltimore inn while
awaiting a ship sailing to Boston. Following dinner on the
evening before their planned departure, Keep drank from a
stone jug thinking it contained apple cider. Unfortunately, the
stone jug contained a caustic acid used for cleaning woodburning stoves. Despite the best efforts of physicians to purge
his system of the caustic acid, he lingered a week in what was
described in a letter to his Boston family as "tormenting pain"
before he finally died.
CONCLUSION
As it turned out, this contract became something of a Greek
tragedy. Keep's successful pursuit of the government contract to
build naval facilities at Pensacola recalls the maxim, "For fools
rush in where angels fear to tread." Both literally and figuratively, Keep's fatal undoing was the Pensacola Navy Yard contract with the government.
From the vantage point of 170 years, the motivation that
moved the Navy Board to renege on its contract with Keep is
largely speculation and conjecture. Agency theory suggests that
the government agent's actions were motivated by self-interest.
And yet, Lt. Commander McCall, who was Keep's chief antagonist, gained nothing monetarily from his actions. Self-interest
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narrowly defined as furtherance of monetary advantage does not
measure up to the task of explaining the conduct of government
agents in this situation. Thus, Mills' concerns with the application of agency theory into the study of accounting history appear to be supported.
Agency theory assumes the rule of law. The legal system is
assumed to enforce the contract based on publicly observable
and verifiable information. At this stage in the development of
our country, the rule of law was not systematized, institutionalized, and enforced without regard to the personalities involved
to the extent assumed in modern agency theory. Therefore, the
Keep contract demonstrates the hazards of projecting modern
agency theory too far in historical research. If agency theory is
to be used in historical research, its limitations must be acknowledged. Agency theory must allow for certain frictions, e.g.,
furtherance of personal antagonism and overriding loyalty, to
afford an adequate explanation for conduct.
It is unfortunate that neither members of Congress nor representatives of the executive branch of government were interested or sympathetic to Keep's claims against the Navy. Had an
institutionalized appeal process been in place, e.g., an independent and impartial civilian contract review board, perhaps Keep
would have fared better.
In general, the level of literacy and competence exhibited by
participants in this contract is impressive. The project accounting records and supporting memoranda are remarkable for their
clarity and completeness. Contrary to the government auditor's
commentary, Keep and his accounting clerk maintained meticulous records of cash disbursements and detailed reports on construction labor. For the nine months (October 1826 to June
1827) all the construction activities at the Pensacola Naval Station are completely chronicled. Construction costs, at least in
terms of labor provided by the civilian contractor, are fully
documented. Labor cost information was recorded in a way that
facilitated cost analysis by individual structure or task, i.e., labor
costs for the commandant's house, base hospital, and other
buildings and structures were each tracked separately. The
project financial records are the product of a rudimentary single
entry system which simply chronicled cash receipts and disbursements activities in a day book format. No double entry
ledgers were maintained nor were financial statements for the
project prepared.
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